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CONTRACT IN CONTEXT AND CONTRACT
AS CONTEXT
Larry A. DiMatteo*
Blake D. Morant**
[Liaw generally, and contract law specifically, have too many
rooms to unlock with one key.'
Is my understanding only blindness to my own lack of
understanding?2
INTRODUCTION
The annual Business Law Symposium of the Wake Forest Law
Review has a distinguished legacy of noteworthy programs that shed
light on seminal issues affecting contemporary business in the
United States. This edition builds on that tradition of excellence
with a focus on the ubiquitous phenomenon of contracts and
bargaining behavior. Contract law appears as a set of policies and
rules that provide order for those who transact bargains. Indeed,
contract law and the rules that it engenders seemingly facilitate an
efficient system of transactional conduct that, on its face, appears
objective.
Theoretical premises for the formation of contracts support this
view. The genesis of a legally enforceable agreement centers on
assent4 and the requirement of a bargained-for exchange of value.'
* Huber Hurst Professor of Contract Law & Legal Studies, Warrington
College of Business Administration, University of Florida. The authors would
like to thank the Symposium Editors for their outstanding organizational skills,
as well as the participants of the Symposium for their dedicated scholarship
and enthusiastic participation at the Symposium.
** Dean and Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. In
addition to the dedicated staff of the Law Review, I enthusiastically
acknowledge the following individuals who inspired my work on this project:
Professor Larry DiMatteo, my coauthor who inspired creative thoughts; Kathy
J. Hines, my administrative assistant, for her efforts on multiple drafts; and
Mrs. Paulette J. Morant, for her support and encouragement.
1. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (1984).
2. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 54e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H.
von Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Blackwell 1975) (1969).
3. See Blake D. Morant, The Relevance of Race and Disparity in
Discussions of Contract Law, 31 NEw ENG. L. REV. 889, 890-91 (1997).
4. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.1, at 200 (3d
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The seeming simplicity of this formula presumably ensures
certainty and predictability. Economic principles also provide
justification for the objectivity of contract rules. Conventional
wisdom suggests that contract law functions empirically, objectively
enforcing the idiosyncratic preferences of those who enter into
enforceable agreements.
Mundane bargaining transactions support the appearance of
objectivity. Individuals regularly and routinely enter into
enforceable contracts for the payments of mortgages or rent; the
purchase of supplies, materials, and chattels; or the lease or
purchase of a motor vehicle." The frequency of these successful
transactions suggests that contract rules operate seamlessly and
objectively, thereby facilitating the efficient operation of the
contemporary marketplace.
The apparent "empiricism of contract may be little more than
an egalitarian facade."9 Contracts, which are borne of human
behavior, reflect the context in which they are formed. A contextual
approach to contract presumes that preferences are not entirely
preformed, but are influenced and altered by the contractual context
and the supposedly neutral set of contract law rules that apply to
that particular context. Context not only shapes the substance of
ed. 2004) ("The first requirement [for a valid contract], that of assent, follows
from the premise that contractual liability is consensual."); see also JOHN
EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 29, at 59 (4th ed., LexisNexis
2001) ("A basic question of contract law is whether two or more parties arrived
at an agreement, i.e., whether the parties have manifested their mutual assent
concerning their future conduct.").
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981); see also SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4.1, at 322 (Richard A. Lord
ed., 4th ed. 2007) ("[Mlutual assent must be manifested by one party to the
other, and except as so manifested, is unimportant.").
6. See Morant, supra note 3, at 903-05. The Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") provides a probative definition of contract, meaning "the total legal
obligation that results from the parties' agreement as determined by [the UCC]
as supplemented by any other applicable law." U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(12) (2004); see
also Blake D. Morant, The Teachings of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and
Contract Theory: An Intriguing Comparison, 50 ALA. L. REV. 63, 95 (1998)
[hereinafter Morant, Teachings] (noting that contract rules, as codified in the
UCC, "were designed to maintain the efficient operation of society's
marketplace" and "provide ] state recognition of private bargaining rights").
7. See Morant, Teachings, supra note 6, at 68, 69 & n.28.
8. See Idaho Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190, 203 (1966)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 81-1453, at 25 (1949) (Conf. Rep.) to aid in defining the
types of transactions that may qualify as consumer sales); see also 112 CONG.
REC. 11,003-04 (1966) (acknowledging that the sundry consumer transactions
that are commonplace in the market include transactions at grocery stores,
hardware stores, coal dealers, automobile dealers, clothiers, dry goods
merchants, department stores, etc.).
9. Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay in Realism,
4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 5 (1998) (discussing the pseudoempiricism of contract
law).
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the bargain, but also provides an analytical template required to
interpret the terms of the bargain. The rules of contract seemingly
eschew contextual realities that affect bargaining. o As a result, one
might logically assume that contextual factors are irrelevant in the
resolution of contract disputes. Moreover, decision makers-who
themselves are influenced by contextual realities such as their
beliefs, thoughts, and judgments-further challenge the notion that
contract law is purely objective and empirical.
To interpret contractual terms or decide disputes without
consideration of the context that framed the bargain is a
disingenuous analysis at best. Any meaningful and judicious review
of contractual matters requires the application of contract rules
within an analytical framework that includes the context in which
contracts are formed."
A recent exhibition entitled Art, Media and Material Witness
posed a series of questions which, with the transposition of the
phrase "contract law" for the words "art" or "media," nicely
illuminates the meaning of contract in context. 2 What is the
relationship between contract law and the historical, political, and
social changes of the time? Do lawyers and legal scholars act as
witnesses to changes in that relationship? If so, is their "testimony"
as to the interpretation of contract law relevant to the
understanding of the relationship of law and change, and the
resolution of social-legal dissonance? What form does this legal
testimony take? What is the significance of contract law in societal
discourse? Can contract law change the manner in which
transacting parties interact in the world of business? This
Symposium provides a series of articles that innovatively address
these mostly rhetorical questions and emphasize the importance of
context as an important analytical tool.
The fundamental questions inspired by Art, Media and Material
Witness are central given the evidence of rampant one-sidedness in
contracts related to the recent financial crises." The overreaching
10. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 4, § 3.6, at 192-94 (comparing theories of
assent and concluding that the objective theory of contract, which does not take
subjective intent into account, is universally accepted among courts today).
11. Morant, supra note 3, at 891-92.
12. See Press Release, Samuel P. Harn Museum of Art, Contemporary Art
Exhibition at the Ham Museum Explores Artists as Witnesses (Aug. 25, 2009),
available at http://www.harn.ufl.edu/press/e78.php; see also D. Gordon Smith &
Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 Aiz. L. REV. 1, 40 (2009)
(noting that "institutional theory highlights the extent to which contracts
communicate legitimacy to a broader set of stakeholders," and that
"organizational theories ... reveal the diverse purposes of contracts and the
various roles that lawyers play when drafting contracts").
13. See generally Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008) (describing deficiencies in consumer credit
regulation that have contributed to large-scale economic problems). The quick
passage of a federal law to restrict credit card companies' freedom of contract
20101 551
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represented by the granting of subprime loans, wholesale
misrepresentation of financial instruments and their ratings, and
the profound asymmetrical information and moral hazard problems
associated with the appropriation and selling of risk have often
characterized bargaining in the corporate landscape.14 In the world
of home loan decision making, some have observed that "[d]ifferent
borrowers . .. falling along socioeconomic lines, make the home loan
decision in different contexts, contexts that influence which
cognitive and emotional processes will come into play."'5 The fact
that emotion and biases affect decision making requires contract law
to play a role in effecting rational and fair bargaining. Contract law
requires more than the broad modeling of a market actor who could
be susceptible to cognitive errors and biases. This over-inclusive
approach does not adequately address the influences of such
sociological factors as race, gender, class, and culture.'6  In such
contracting contexts, mandatory disclosure rules may not be enough
to overcome cognitive errors and discriminatory influences. These
errors and influences are often manipulated by the stronger or more
sophisticated party." Instead, "choice guidance rules" are needed in
certain contexts to ensure a threshold of freedom of contract.
Facilitative (freedom of contract)'" and context-driven
regulatory" functions of contract law remain central to most debates
was a response to that industry's abuse of power in the changing of rolling
contracts. Among other things, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility
and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009) does the
following: (1) bans rate increases on existing balances due to "any time, any
reason" or "universal default" provisions, and severely restricts retroactive rate
increases due to late payment; (2) requires that contract terms be clearly
spelled out and remain stable for the entirety of the first year; and (3) bars
unfair terms, including late fee traps and unfair subprime fees.
14. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 13, at 3-5.
15. Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The
Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 760 (2006); see also
Brian M. McCall, Learning from Our History: Evaluating the Modern Housing
Finance Market in Light of Ancient Principles of Justice, 60 S.C. L. REV. 707,
712 (2009) (arguing that the current financial crisis is primarily a failure of
commutative justice).
16. See Willis, supra note 15, at 760.
17. For example, Willis notes that a large percentage of subprime
borrowers actually qualified for lower interest rates than the ones they
received. Id. at 730.
18. In its classical form, legal formalism is the belief that in "any legal
question, there was the possibility that, properly analyzed, the correct answer
could be arrived at by applying basic principles that were both derived from and
reflected in case law." Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle
of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 94, 106 (2000) (emphasis omitted).
19. Contextualism is often attached to the work of the legal realists who
saw the "attempt to explain all of contract doctrine on the basis of a few general
principles [as] chimerical and destructive." Contracts and the Market, in
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 79 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993).
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on the proper role of contract law in a complex, modem economy. 20
Despite epoch-related characterizations of contract law as more or
less formalistic in nature, the tensions between formal and
contextual, internal and external, 21 and deduction and induction are
constant. Contract law as a rules-based order requires formal
application, but context is needed to apply contract rules to evolving
transaction types that redefine bargaining relationships. Contract
law formulation, in the words of Martha Minow, is part of a process
in which law is attached "to the social contexts in which norms can
be generated and given meaning."22 It is these social-contractual
contexts that influence contract law's choice between freedom of
contract or status-based solutions.
In an increasingly complex economy, contract law's development
moves from a general, freedom-of-contract-based body of law to
contextual, status-based bodies of specialized law. Instead of a
unilateral debate over the power of a unified, formalistic theory that
explains contracts as mere abstractions, this introductory Article
and others in this Symposium examine whether contract law is best
understood as a group of specialized, context-driven bodies of law.
This approach incorporates both descriptive and normative features.
A descriptive query probes whether contract law can be better
understood through the prism of context to reveal its true nature in
practice. A view that contract law is influenced by status-based
relationships suggests that the examination of context will, at times,
more effectively regulate freedom of contract.23 A prescriptive view
20. Gregory Klass poses a compound theory of contract law in which
opposing theories of contract law can be divided into those that see contract law
as power-conferring and those that see it as duty-imposing. See Gregory Klass,
Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1726, 1726 (2008) ("The dual function of compound rules provides empirical
support for pluralist justifications of contract law.").
21. Duncan Kennedy critically characterizes the internal perspective as a
"legal consciousness" aimed at masking law's internal contradictions, as well as
the influence of externally masked influences: "It is a set of concepts and
intellectual operations that evolves according to a pattern of its own, and
exercises an influence on results distinguishable from those of political power
and economic interest." DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL
LEGAL THOUGHT 2 (2006).
22. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE
L.J. 1860, 1861 (1987).
23. Eighty-some years ago, Nathan Isaacs posed a cycle theory of common
law development. He rejected Sir Henry Maine's proposition that law evolved
from a status-based system to one of freedom of contract. Instead, Isaacs
asserted that the common law oscillated between periods of status-based,
standardized relationships and freedom-of-contract-based relationships. See
generally Nathan Isaacs, "The Law" and the Law of Change: A Tentative Study
in Comparative Jurisprudence, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (1917); Nathan Isaacs, The
Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917); Larry A. DiMatteo &
Samuel Flaks, Beyond Rules, 47 Hous. L. REV. 297 (2010) (analyzing the
conservative legal realism movement through the life and works of Nathan
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requires that certain contextual factors be more fully and overtly
embraced in contract law application.2 4 The recognition of the role
of such external factors as race, gender, ethnicity, language,
information, and power asymmetries suggests that contract law can
gain greater salience if such factors are incorporated within its
interpretation and policing functions.
Part II of this introductory Article briefly examines the most
popular, unitary theories of law. It questions any one theory's
explanatory power over the breadth of contract issues and types of
contracts. It supports the idea that each theory of contract can be
used to explain certain contract rules, but not contract law as a
whole. This Symposium buttresses this idea with the collective view
that contract law can best be described and guided through a
context-driven inquiry. A contextual theory of contract law
recognizes the need for flexible rules for different contractual
contexts and the elastic application of those rules across contexts. A
contextual theory of contract law also recognizes a number of
phenomena. First, contract interpretation, through the lens of
context, should be used to regulate influences that question the
purity of the freedom of contract upon which most agreements are
based. Second, the construct of contract has been creatively applied
to areas that are not immediately envisioned within the body of
contract law.
Part III then examines the different uses of context that
illustrate the relationship between contract law and society. It
notes that "contract in context," for the purposes of the Symposium,
is broadly defined. This Part provides a taxonomy of contract law in
context that includes internal and external perspectives. Part III
recognizes that societal context frames contract law, but also
observes that contract law can frame the private ordering of society.
This two-way flow of context, between the greater socioeconomic-
cultural sphere and contract as context, analyzes the relationship of
contract types and the contextual interpretation of contracts. It
concludes by examining the relationship of context to paternalism
and consent. Part IV then notes the role of power and identity in
the formation and interpretation of contracts, and contract law's
shortcomings in recognizing such influences in the search for
contractual justice. Finally, Part V introduces the works presented
at the Symposium.
I. UNITARY THEORIES AND MANY CONTEXTS
Contract law serves a number of purposes, including respect for
private autonomy and consent-based obligations, enforcement of the
moral obligation of promise, protection of reasonable expectations of
Isaacs).
24. See Morant, supra note 3, at 896-97.
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the promise-receiving party, enhancement of social utility, and the
general preservation of contractual relationships.25 These numerous
purposes have supplied the means for legal scholars to frame unified
theories that explain contract law. The theory based on the
preservation of promises centers on the moral imperative to honor
one's promises. A prominent vocal proponent of this theory is
Professor Shiffrin, who emphasizes the interrelationship between
the morality of promise and contract law.2 6 She rejects expectation
27damages as a surrogate for the binding nature of contracts.
Instead, she argues that the commitment to perform, unless
provided otherwise expressly in the contract, is a legally binding and
moral commitment to perform one's duty and not a commitment to
either perform or pay damages.2 ' The civil law system actualizes
Professor Shiffrin's argument. Section 241 of the German Civil
Code succinctly states that "[b]y virtue of an obligation," the
promisee "is entitled to demand performance from the [promisor]."29
Thus, the underlying morality of promise explains civil law's
recognition of specific performance as an ordinary remedy.
Professor Oman expands on this point in his article, Bargaining in
the Shadow of God's Law: Islamic Mahr Contracts and the Perils of
Legal Specialization,o in which he explores the intersection between
morality, religion, and contract law. He questions the harm
produced by shunting general principles of law in favor of
specialized bodies of rules in certain areas. In his article, Oman
notes that the application of specialized rules-namely, the law of
divorce or equitable distribution-to Islamic mahr contracts is a
misapplication and a misreading of such contracts.3 ' Oman
concludes that such contracts are best dealt with by the general law
of contracts.
Another commonly recognized theory of contract law asserts
that its sole purpose is the promotion of private autonomy.32
Freedom of contract is the theory's central focus. Closely aligned
with private autonomy are the efficiency norms, which explain
contracts as expressions of party preferences and the use of
25. See Blake D. Morant, Contractual Rules and Terms and the
Maintenance of Bargains: The Case of the Fledgling Writer, 18 HASTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 453, 455 (1996).
26. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise,
120 HARv. L. REV. 708, 749-53 (2007).
27. Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 MICH. L.
REv. 1551, 1563-67 (2009).
28. Id. at 1567-68.
29. BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896,
Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 53, as amended, § 241, % 1, sentence 1.
30. Nathan B. Oman, Bargaining in the Shadow of God's Law: Islamic
Mahr Contracts and the Perils of Legal Specialization, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
579 (2010).
31. See id. at 580-81.
32. See Kennedy, supra note 18, at 160-63.
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hypothetical intent to reveal those preferences. The private-
autonomy principle is reflected in the will theory of contracts. Will
theory as a guiding principle is reflected in a purely objective
interpretation of contracts in which courts strictly enforce contracts
as promulgated. Strict interpretation can be problematic given the
fact that the will of the parties is rarely fully specified. Contract law
must therefore provide rules that fill gaps in the parties' agreement.
Another development that undermines the functionality of will
theory is the prevalent use of standard form contracting in which
freedom of contract may conflict with the reality of private
autonomy when the bargaining relationship is one sided.
According to Professors Schwartz and Scott, the autonomy
principle readily applies to firm-to-firm contracts, in which
bargaining relationships have some degree of parity." They argue
for a return to classical contract law's formalism in the
interpretation of such contracts. Contract law for these bargaining
firms should "be narrower and more deferential to contracting
parties than the contract law we now have." The normative
grounding for this argument is that firms would likely choose the
certainty of narrowly interpreted contracts over a doctrine that
permits interpretation based upon fairness norms applied post hoc.
They further posit that firm-to-firm contracting is "conditioned on
few states of the world, and maximizes joint gains in a wide variety
of contexts."" The isolation of firm-to-firm contracts as a special
species of contract confirms that context-dependent rules are
indispensible in the law of contracts. Moreover, the feasibility of
this theory rests on the assumption that firm-to-firm contracts are
immune from the contextual influences discussed in this
Symposium. This assumption becomes suspect, however, given the
power disparities present among different firms in the context of
particular industries. Professor Barnhizer, in his article, Context as
Power: Defining the Field of Battle for Advantage in Contractual
Interactions, explores the role of power in the formulation and
application of contract law.37 He presents a theory of contract law in
which contracts are primarily exercises in power and argues that
power structures are often transformed into contract law.
While Schwartz and Scott's interfirm model of legal formalism
remains a plausible goal, its validity remains rooted in the context
33. Id. at 115-16.
34. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544-48 (2003).
35. Id. at 618.
36. Id. They further assert that a "normative theory of contract law that
takes party sovereignty seriously shows that much of the expansion of contract
law over the last fifty years has been ill-advised." Id. at 619.
37. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Context as Power: Defining the Field of Battle for
Advantage in Contractual Interactions, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 607 (2010).
38. See id. at 608-10.
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in which firms bargain with other firms. 9 Relational contract
theory, which is contextual in nature, questions a unitary view of
firm-to-firm contracts. 4 0 A strict interpretative model, as suggested
by Schwartz and Scott, becomes difficult to apply given that many
contracts are embedded in long-term, evolving relationships. These
resulting contracts become part of a social-normative structure.
In light of the contextual realities that affect most bargaining
relationships, modem contract law loosens the requirement of
definiteness with the search for the hypothetical intent or bargain of
the parties.4 A determination of what the parties would have
agreed to, based upon party characteristics and the context of the
bargain, is used to fill in gaps in contracts. In the standard form
scenario, the problem of intent has been at least partially solved by
Llewellyn's bifurcation of intent between the specific intent to be
bound by dickered terms and a blanket assent to all "reasonable"
nondickered terms.42 The specific intent concept acknowledges that
the promise, will, and consent bases of contract law center on the
promisor's perspective in determining contractual obligation.
Blanket assent and reliance theory focuses upon the promisee's
reasonable expectations as generated by the promise-giver.43
Modern contract law presently recognizes numerous context-
driven distinctions. These distinctions include merchant-
consumer,44 sophisticated-unsophisticated, and individual-firm.46
While fundamentally valid in purpose, these distinctions often
truncate the contextual inquiry. Once parties are labeled as a
merchant, a sophisticated bargainer, or as a firm, contract law
establishes the presumption that such parties understood and
consented to all the terms of the contract and were not per se the
victim of opportunism or overreaching. Such distinctions are
indeed superficial. A richer contextual inquiry would study the
asymmetrical information or power disparities in place of the
39. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 34, at 544; see also Meredith R. Miller,
Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 Mo. L. REV.
493, 535-36 (2009) (noting that courts need to "take a contextual ... approach
to determining whether formalist principles apply").
40. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and
Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 877, 881 (2000) (outlining the "core propositions" of
relational contract theory).
41. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1116-17.
42. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 (1960).
43. Id.; see also Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Interpretation in the Realm
of Idealism, 5 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 17,62 (2006).
44. See U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2004) (defining "merchant"); id. § 2-205 (2004)
(imposing the "firm offer rule" on merchant sellers, but not on consumer
sellers).
45. See Miller, supra note 39, at 493-96.
46. See Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts:
The Challenge That Is Yet To Be Met, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 723, 723-27 (2008).
47. Miller, supra note 39, at 495-96.
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labeling of transactions based upon preconceived distinctions.
Contract law's present distinctions are part of the context of a
transaction, but should be viewed as initial steps in the contextual
inquiry.
The various theories provide only a partial explanation of
contract law. 9 This partiality, which may appear limiting, forms
the basis for what Robert Hillman calls the richness of contract
law.o This richness denotes that contractual rules and principles
have meaning only if viewed and applied in the context of the legal
and sociocultural system in which bargains are formed."' Professor
Kim explores the pervasive influence of sociocultural factors with
her examination of contract law within the context of global
transactions. In Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural Context,
Kim shows that cultural dissonance, which is a humanistic reality
borne from the differences in cross-cultural views of identity and
gender, requires an analysis of cultural context in order to protect
the reasonable expectations of the parties.5 2
48. Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract
Law, 40 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 295, 296-97 (2005) (stating that "merchant
versus consumer" is a false dichotomy "because small businesses do not fall
cleanly" into either category); see generally Blake D. Morant, The Quest for
Bargains in an Age of Contractual Formalism: Strategic Initiatives for Small
Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 233 (2003) (analyzing the
bargaining difficulties faced by small businesses).
49. Dennis Patterson has taken issue with the notion of "correct" contract
theory: "Two thousand years of philosophy has failed to yield anything like a
plausible account of what it would mean to provide a 'correct' account of the
'thing' called contract." Dennis M. Patterson, The Philosophical Origins of
Modern Contract Doctrine: An Open Letter to Professor James Gordley, 1991
WIs. L. REV. 1432, 1436; see also The Relevance of Contract Theory: A
Symposium, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 803.
50. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW 6 (1998).
John Finnis explains that the task of contract law is to provide "a fair method of
relating benefits to burdens, and persons to persons, over an immensely wide,
complex, and lasting, though shifting, set of persons and transactions." John M.
Finnis, Law as Co-ordination, 2 RATIO JuRis 97, 102 (1989) (emphasis added).
Marc Galanter argues that neoclassical legal theory continues to see law as a
purely conceptual order and that such a "portrayal ... strips away the richness
of context-and with it the indeterminacy and wildness that is entwined with
the stability and routine of legal life." Marc Galanter, Conceptualizing Legal
Change and Its Effects: A Comment on George Priest's "Measuring Legal
Change," 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 235, 240 (1987).
51. Again, Professor Patterson asserts that "it is better to think of contract
law not as a thing but more akin to an ongoing, self-transforming cultural
activity." Patterson, supra note 49, at 1436. The problem of a purely context-
dependent contract law is suggested in Professor Geis's comment that
"[ulnfortunately, selecting a level of granularity in contract law is a byzantine
problem. Into how many groups should we splinter our society?" George S.
Geis, Review, Economics as Context for Contract Law, 75 U. CI. L. REV. 569,
593 (2008).
52. Nancy S. Kim, Reasonable Expectations in Sociocultural Context, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641 (2010).
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The history of contract law since the later nineteenth century
includes the development of contextual rules.a The most obvious
manifestation of this phenomenon has been the development of
specialized rules for different transaction types, such as the sale of
goods, leasing, government contracting, employment, secured
transactions, and others. Professor Hillman examines the evolving
uniqueness of software contracts and concludes that these
agreements do not fit squarely within the rubric of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")." He discusses the uniqueness
such contracts present and the need for specialized rules. As
Hillman's work-including as Reporter for the American Law
Institute's Principles of the Law of Software Contracts5 -
demonstrates, contract law's richness allows for the adoption of
different rules for new transaction types or, at least, the need for a
more contextual application of established, transactional rules. 6
II. CONTRACT IN CONTEXT
Contract law serves to order individual preferences. Freedom of
contract rests on the premise that preferences are personal and
preexisting, and contracts provide the means for individuals to
satisfy those preferences rationally.57 In reality, preferences are
contingent, parties often act irrationally, and freedom to and from
contract varies depending on the characteristics of the parties and
the context of the bargain. This Part examines the role of context as
it relates to the development of contract law, the interpretation of
contracts, and the role of contract law in framing the ordering of
preferences. This latter function of context sees law itself as
context, along with other social practices, in the formation of
preferences." Contract as context reflects contract law's normative
functions that facilitate and influence the private ordering of
individual preferences. The various topics included in this
Symposium demonstrate the facilitative aspect of context. As a
53. See Ronald J. Mann, Contracts-Only with Consent, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
1873, 1902 (2004) (noting that contract law has evolved over many years into a
system of contextual rules that target specific types of transactions and
industries).
54. Robert A. Hillman, Contract Law in Context: The Case of Software
Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 669 (2010).
55. Robert A. Hillman & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Principles of the Law of
Software Contracts: Some Highlights, 84 TULANE L. REv. 1519(2010).
56. Karl Llewellyn formulated this contextualized notion of contract law as
follows: "very different types of situation, with very different types of need,
already-though covertly-blessed with largely very different types of
governing rule . . . ." K.N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle To Unhorse Sales, 52
HARv. L. REV. 873, 904 (1939).
57. See Robin L. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659,
659-60 (1990).
58. See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and
Supplementation, 97 COLuM. L. REV. 1710, 1753-55 (1997).
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precursor to the discussion by other contributors, this next Part
explores the numerous applications of contract in context and
contract as context.
A. Internal and External Contexts
The importance of context to contract law is similar to all
linguistic enterprises involving reading and writing. Meaning is not
external to context, but is constructed through the interpretation of
the text and its context.59 The internal context of contract law
involves the placing of specific contract rules within the conceptual
whole of the law. The external context is the placement of contract
rules within the socio-cultural-economic reality of a bargain.
1. Internal Context
Internal context refers to the placement of a given rule,
doctrine, or principle within the entire body of contract law. 60 This
descriptive exercise focuses on the relationship of particular rules or
principles to the grand rationales or meta-principles of contract law.
Much of doctrinal analysis seeks to understand how the parts fit
together. In this way contract law can be understood as a thick
texture of rules and doctrines that form a hermeneutic circle-one
that poses the paradox that the whole cannot be understood without
understanding the parts and the parts cannot be understood
without comprehension of the whole.6 ' The theoretical approach of
Ronald Dworkin demonstrates this analysis.62 Dworkin notes that
59. See Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The
Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155,
156 (1999).
60. See Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information, and Trust in the Law of
Sales: The Credit Seller's Right of Reclamation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 247, 338-40
(1996); James E. Westbrook, A Comparison of the Interpretation of Statutes and
Collective Bargaining Agreements: Grasping the Pivot of Tao, 60 Mo. L. REV.
283, 296 (1995).
61. DENNIS M. PATTERSON, GOOD FAITH AND LENDER LIABILITY: TOWARD A
UNIFIED THEORY 34-35 (1990). A similar circle is evidenced by the "hub and
spoke" concept once advanced in association with the revision of Article 2 of the
UCC. Initially, the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State
Laws ("NCCUSL") and the American Law Institute ("ALI") decided to proceed
with a "hub and spoke" approach that would have reconfigured Article 2 into a
central hub of general principles with parts or spokes devoted separately to the
special incidents of sales of goods, leases of goods, and computer information
transactions. For discussions of the hub and spoke idea, see Marion W.
Benfield, Jr. & Peter A. Alces, Reinventing the Wheel, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1405 (1994) and Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangibles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs,
Spokes, and Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1337 (1994).
62. See Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEx. L. REV. 527 (1982)
[hereinafter Dworkin, Interpretation]; Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv.
L. REv. 1057 (1975). Critical analysis argues that this fitting together is an
illusion that masks the inherent contradictions in the law. See generally Clare
Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997
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the internal integrity of contract law allows for rule creation or
adjustment in a given area guided by the need to harmonize the new
rule with the entire body of contract law.r4
2. External (Sociocultural) Context
Contract law is an institution informed by the society in which
it operates. A contextual approach to bargaining behavior sees the
fundamental role of contract law as the attribution of meaning to
human transactions. Modern contract interpretation requires the
placement of a bargain or specific contract term within the context
in which the bargain is formed or performed. The disconnection of
contract law from context (undue abstraction or undue theorizing)
diminishes its functionality. Professor Bridgeman appreciates this
point when he observes the disconnect between formal rules and
norms and between formal rules and context.' In order to
reestablish the norm-context essence of contractual rules, courts
must reconnect the "norms in the rule [s]" and "refer to context in the
rule."" Professor Minow highlights this requirement, stating that
broadened contextual inquiry is needed to "break out of . .. formalist
,,66
categories. Unlike a unitary approach to contract law, the
infusion of context avoids bracketed decision making and permits
better assessment of acts of private autonomy and contractual
consent. Contract law, which orders bargaining relationships and
transactions, should always be tempered by the facts of particular
contexts.67 Failure to consider contextual impacts can become
counterproductive. Professor Abril, in Private Ordering: A
Contractual Approach to Online Interpersonal Privacy, examines the
consequences when law becomes disconnected from norms and
context.64
The meta-rationales that underscore different types of contracts
may differentiate the needs of contracting parties. Beginning with
the core rationale of freedom, different types of contracts are
centered on different secondary rationales. Over time, contract law
has developed contextual rules in response to these underlying
rationales. Consumer sales law has evolved more along a consumer-
(1985).
63. Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 62, at 543-45; see also KENNEDY,
supra note 21, at 94-96.
64. See Curtis Bridgeman, Why Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal
Philosophy: Positivism, Formalism, and the Specification of Rules in Contract
Law, 29 CARDOzO L. REv. 1443, 1476 (2008).
65. Id.
66. Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 89 (1987).
67. Minow provides the rationale for the relationship between concept and
context: "Moving between specific contexts and general commitments, we can
challenge unstated assumptions that might otherwise rule." Id. at 91.
68. Patricia Sanchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to
Online Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689 (2010).
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protection rationale.6 9 In commercial sales law, an expediency
rationale best explains contract law application in this area. Here,
the importance of dealing with unwanted or rejected goods in an
expeditious manner is a core concern.
The domestic-international context of the commercial sale of
goods justifies the different rules found in the UCC and the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
("CISG").70  The UCC provides a buyer-centered approach. Given
the fungible nature of most goods and relatively inexpensive
transport costs in domestic transactions, the UCC provides the
buyer with an absolute right of rejection.n If the seller's ability to
retrieve or resell is manageable, then the buyer's right to reject is a
rational default rule. The UCC encourages the expeditious
disposition of goods by requiring the buyer to preserve and possibly
sell rejected goods.7 ' The CISG, on the other hand, is pro-seller in
this area. The buyer is viewed as the most efficient disposer of
goods whether they are conforming or nonconforming. Buyers must
buy the goods unless there is a provable fundamental breach."
As we move from discrete to long-term or relational contracts,
the importance of trust and loyalty becomes more pronounced.74
The termination of relational contracts engenders closer scrutiny.75
The duty to adjust or renegotiate, along with the norms of good faith
and fair dealing, play more important roles, often non-legally
induced. Contracts in the context of intellectual property licensing are
best understood under a protection rationale. Finally, government
contract law, which provides a highly regulated body of rules to
ensure competitive pricing and responsible performance, is
understandable given the public-trust nature of government
procurement.7  The rationales of transparency and accessibility
underlie this specialized body of contract law.
69. See A. Brooke Overby, An Institutional Analysis of Consumer Law, 34
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1219, 1227-35 (2001).
70. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 668 [hereinafter CISG].
71. See U.C.C. § 2-601(a) (2004).
72. See id. §§ 2-703, -706.
73. See CISG, supra note 70, arts. 46(2), 49(1)(a).
74. See Richard E. Spiedel, Afterword: The Shifting Domain of Contract, 90
Nw. U. L. REV. 254, 264 ("Relational contracts, by necessity, are incomplete and
dependent upon good faith adjustments after the time of formation.").
75. Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity's Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the
Twentieth Century's Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 265, 317-19 (1999).
76. See Joseph Richard Falcon, Comment, Managing Intellectual Property
Rights: The Cost of Innovation, 6 DUQ. Bus. L.J. 241, 241 (2004).
77. For a general primer on government contracts, see Blake D. Morant,
The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains: Procedural
Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925,
952-54.
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3. Contract Law as Context
Cass Sunstein asserts that the free market is a legal construct.
It is legal rules that make private property and the free exchange of
that property possible.79 As such, legal rules have a direct bearing
on the economic system and society as a whole. Viewed through this
systemic lens, contract law imposes a market order through the
development of legal concepts and rules. At the same time, contract
law responds to changes in market transactions. The a priori
ordering of the market by law is short-lived because socioeconomic
pressures require the development of new rules or the adjustment of
existing ones. A contextual understanding of contract law shortens
the lag between rule and reality. Because social practices are not
homogeneous, contract law must be context dependent. Context-
dependency, given an increasingly complex contracting
environment, leads to the development of more specialized groups of
rules.80
Contextual aspects of contract law also explain different social
practices and other areas of law. One example of this point is the
contract construct's application to the non-contract (non-legal)
dimension of the employment relationship. In the human resource
management area, the employment relationship implores a theory of
psychological contract."' Within law, the contractual basis for
limited liability companies ("LLCs") rests on the freedom of contract
goals of entity formation.82 The debate in this application of
contract law focuses on whether the parties have the freedom to
eliminate managerial fiduciary duties. In Legal Realism, the LLC,
and a Balanced Approach to the Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing, Professor Miller argues that the "LLC as
contract" approach must balance freedom of contract principles with
statutory-based protections.
4. Contextualism, Contract Types, and Unconscionability
Contextualism in its broadest sense is the incorporation of
78. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 5 (1997).
79. Id.
80. See WOUTER DE BEEN, LEGAL REALISM REGAINED 101 (2008). Professor
Willis states that "the heterogeneity of contexts in which people find themselves
leads to heterogeneous behaviors." Willis, supra note 15, at 760.
81. See generally NEIL CONWAY & ROB B. BRINER, UNDERSTANDING
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTS AT WORK (2005) (reviewing literature on the
psychological contract theory of employment).
82. See Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Jaffari, 727 A.2d 286, 295 (Del. 1999)
(interpreting the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act and observing that
"the policy of the Act is to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of
contract and to the enforceability of LLC agreements").
83. Sandra K. Miller, Legal Realism, the LLC, and a Balanced Approach to
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
729 (2010).
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nontextual elements into the interpretive process. The interpretive
process involves both the attribution of meaning to a private
contract and the attribution of meaning to contract rules in their
application to a particular contractual context." Subjective
contextualism focuses on the characteristics of the parties. A
number of the participants in this Symposium have written about
the need to expand the use of context to understand the influences of
bias, gender, race, culture, and power on the formation,
interpretation, and enforcement of contracts.8 6 An example of this
line of inquiry is presented here by Professor Threedy in her article,
Dancing Around Gender: Lessons from Arthur Murray on Gender
and Contracts.7 In contrast, objective contextualism looks to trends
or developments in society and business to uncover new types of
contracts. 8 In this way, the law determines whether a
differentiated body of rules is needed to respond appropriately to the
new type of contract. Again, Professor Hillman looks at this
phenomenon in the area of software contracts."9
Karl Llewellyn recognized in his seminal work the importance
of context in the interpretation of contract terms and the application
of contract law.o Utilizing Llewellyn's theory of contract
interpretation, a court places the case at hand within the context of
"transaction types." Taken from the social context of the contract,
these types include "role types" and "group types." Transaction type
relates to the subject matter of the contract (sale, lease, license, as
well as whether it is long-term or discrete).9' Characteristics of the
parties-such as merchant, consumer, minor, or arms-length
negotiator-define role types.92 Group type focuses on the type of
business, industry, or profession."
In contrast to a contextual approach, legal formalism treats
84. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of
Interpretation, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 397, 402-03 (2004).
85. Kent Greenawalt, A Pluralist Approach to Interpretation: Wills and
Contracts, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 533, 576 (2005).
86. See, e.g., Patricia S. Abril, "Acoustic Segregation" and the Hispanic
Small Business Owner, 10 HARv. LATINO L. REV. 1 (2007); Larry A. DiMatteo &
Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study
of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067 (2006); Morant, supra note 3;
Debora L. Threedy, Feminists & Contract Doctrine, 32 IND. L. REV. 1247 (1999).
87. Debora L. Threedy, Dancing Around Gender: Lessons from Arthur
Murray on Gender and Contracts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749 (2010).
88. See DiMatteo, supra note 84, at 458-62.
89. See generally Hillman, supra note 54.
90. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 42, at 20.
91. DiMatteo, supra note 84, at 483.
92. Id. Through such a context-driven methodology, role types
"are .. . constructed jointly by ... law and ... society." Todd D. Rakoff, The
Implied Terms of Contracts: Of 'Default Rules' and 'Situation-Sense,' in GOOD
FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAw 191, 216 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann
eds., 1995).
93. DiMatteo, supra note 84, at 483.
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contracting parties as fungible, acontextual beings. The
incorporation of contextual evidence challenges formalism's uniform
characterizations. 94 While contract law's policing doctrines-such as
duress, undue influence, misrepresentation, and unconscionability-
permit greater use of context, they fail to provide the level of
protection required to counter discriminatory behavior related to
race, gender, and class. Some have argued for the contextual
expansion of unconscionability to include the impact of such factors
as race, gender, or lack of business sophistication.9 5
In applying the doctrine of unconscionability, the problem posed
by inequalities in bargaining power and how it can be affected by a
number of factors such as race, gender, and class has not been
adequately analyzed. The use of such factors is often obscured by
the formalistic definitions of procedural and substantive
unconscionability.96 Although it is likely that some courts use such
factors in applying the doctrine, in general a greater recognition of
such factors in determining procedural unconscionability would be
both appropriate and congruous with the contextual examination of
the parties' respective bargaining positions. At present, policing
doctrines fail to recognize the more insidious nature of biased
behavior. The very nature of policing doctrines presumes that abuse
of freedom of contract is only found in exceptional instances. The
examination of biased behavior in contract interpretation permits
broader policing of contracts that are a product of such negative
contextual influences.
The insidious nature of bias is seen at the grass roots of contract
interpretation. Some have argued that the reasonable person
standard is not a gender- and race-neutral fabrication, but often
reinforces patriarchy and privileges the understandings of white
94. See DE BEEN, supra note 80, at 5-8.
95. See, e.g., Morant, supra note 3, at 929-30 (contending that
unconscionability review should allow proof of how stereotypes and negative
perceptions of disadvantaged groups affected the resulting contract).
96. See, e.g., Higgins v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 293, 301 (Ct. App.
2006) (finding a mandatory arbitration agreement to be procedurally and
substantively unconscionable based on formalistic definitions, but omitting any
substantial discussion of contextual factors).
97. See Morant, supra note 3, at 893-94, 910 ("To ignore subjective issues
of race, gender, or issues of disparity would be disingenuous when in fact such
factors . .. impact both analysis of factual situations and outcome of disputes.
... One factor the classicists fail to appreciate . . . is that consent is not formed
in a sterile environment, protected from pejorative external influences. Human
frailties such as prejudice, negative opportunism, avarice, and bias may work to
skew the assent of either the offeror or offeree.") (footnotes omitted); see also
Curtis Bridgeman, Allegheny College Revisited: Cardozo, Consideration, and
Formalism in Context, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 149, 152 (2005) (supporting the
use of contextual formalism to aid in the understanding of a charitable gift
case).
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men." For example, the understandings of the reasonable person
are premised upon a reasonable level of education and knowledge.
Amy Kastely argues that factors such as the lack of education act as
surrogates for race without focusing on the influences of race- or
class-based biases on the incorporation of unreasonable contract
terms.99  Constructed thresholds of reasonableness insulate the
reasonable person from the influences of lack of knowledge,
discrimination, and bias. A hierarchy of reasonableness rationality
mirrors the "hierarchies of race, class, and gender . . . ."'oo At the top
of the interpretive hierarchy is a rational, reasonable white male.
Reasonable-person rationality has become the product of the
masculine, acontextual, and abstractly rational view of decision
making.'o A more contextual, less abstract theory of interpretation
would expand the realm of unreasonableness not captured under the
present reasonable person standard. In the end, Kastely concludes
that the reasonable person is a practical tool that reduces
transaction costs, but allocates much of the remaining costs to those
who do not possess the characteristics and expectations to fit within
the formalistic conception of the reasonable person.0 2 Professor
Threedy expands on this point as she analyzes similarly situated
parties of different sexes in cases with nearly identical fact
patterns. 1s
B. Paternalism Versus Consent in Context
If consent reinforces private autonomy, then a fuller
appreciation of the dimensions of consent safeguards freedom of
contract and avoids undue paternalism. The argument here is that
most one-sided contracts and the influences of discrimination,
98. See, e.g., Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law: From the
Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1, 51-57 (1995) (arguing that
objectivity is a culture-relative fabrication and that contract doctrine needs to
better reflect the multicultural makeup of society); Amy H. Kastely, Out of the
Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort,
Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 293-94 (1994) ("By
featuring the understandings and expectations of privileged white men as the
standard for contract interpretation, the objective theory establishes and
maintains a white, class-privileged, male norm as the governing law of
contractual obligation.").
99. See Kastely, supra note 98, at 304-06.
100. Id. at 294.
101. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
Throughout her work, Gilligan argues that mainstream theories of moral
development privilege the abstract, rational-thinking propensity of males and
ignore the more nuanced, situational, contextual decision-making preferences of
females. Id.; see also Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored
Band Aid-Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue, and Norms, 28 Hous. L. REV. 791,
800-07 (1991) (explaining the feminist theory of obligations and demonstrating
the stark contrasts between feminist theory and legal formalism).
102. Kastely, supra note 98, at 295.
103. See generally Threedy, supra note 87.
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irrationality, and inequality of bargaining power can be understood
as failures of consent.10' Professor Harrison has argued for a
broader view of substantive unconscionability coupled with public
notice of substantive unconscionability findings as a means to
alleviate systemic class bias.' 1 Harrison recognizes that consent is
problematic in a system in which weaker parties have been
conditioned to take less.106  Substantive-fairness or distributive-
justice issues aside, true consent provides a firewall against
inefficient and unjust contracts. Harrison's "public notice"
suggestion may enhance consent of the disadvantaged party in
interclass contracting.' 7 Unconscionability's procedural element,
the analysis of which is often cursory in most cases, could become an
effective means to balance freedom of contract and paternalistic
norms. 08 The enhancement of consent for typically disadvantaged
bargainers diminishes the likelihood of the creation of unfair
contracts. This consent-based view of unfairness is congruous with
the will theory and private autonomy precepts of common law
contracts. Under this rationale, the potential unfairness of one-
sided contracts is not so much related to the sheer one-sidedness of
the bargain, but to a lack of meaningful consent. Such consent-
focused inquiries are what Llewellyn viewed as the essence of a
realist method-to look at the reality of daily life with its
irrationality and power imbalances.'o
104. For evidence of the effect of gender bias, racial discrimination, and
bargaining power inequality in the context of automotive sales, see generally
Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991).
105. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and
Unconscionability, 35 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 445, 492-93 (1994).
106. Harrison states that "[t]hose who have less tend to agree to continue to
take less." Id. at 501. In such a system, "terms like 'agree' and 'consent' have
only the thinnest of meanings." Id.
107. See id. at 501. For an argument against the recognition of a duty of
disclosure by sellers in mass-market transactions, see Joshua Fairfield, The
Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of Contract, 58 EMORY L.J.
1401 (2009). Fairfield argues that information-cost theory shows that the
benefits of a disclosure to procure "informed consent" are outweighed by the
benefits of enforcing standard terms in mass-market contracts. Id. at 1403-05.
108. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 86, at 1115-16 (concluding that
empirical analysis shows that consent factors are the most predictive factors in
courts' unconscionability decisions); Morant, supra note 77, at 936
("Paternalism checks the legitimacy of consent. . . .").
109. Llewellyn notes: "What realism was, and is, is a method .... "
LLEWELLYN, supra note 42, at 510. While studying the judicial system of the
Cheyenne Indians, Llewellyn noted that the tribe's methods, which were not
recorded as a set of formal rules, but rather were considered "law ways," were
admirable in their recognition of context and their incorporation of the law into
daily life. See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT
157-58 (1973).
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C. The Normative Function of Contract Law
Traditional contract doctrine should provide incentives to
enhance consent. To this end, contract interpretation should
account for a broader scope of contextual factors, including the
gender, race, power, and class of the bargaining parties. Federal
government contract law which seeks to diminish bargaining
disparities and thereby enhance consent provides a template for this
broader contextual analysis."0 Government contract law consists of
"a complex matrix of positive laws" that are premised upon the
importance of competition, fairness, and transparency." Consent
viewed as a relative standard sees context as a means to verify
meaningful consent." 2 As a result of this realistic consideration of
context, federal contracting policy ameliorates traditional bargain
disparities through enhanced access to government contracting for
traditionally disadvantaged bargainers."3
The binary nature of positive and negative freedom of contract
explains the tension in contract law between its facilitative, power-
conferring role and its value-laden, duty-imposing interventions.
The view of contract law as a preference-protecting device fails to
recognize that "a person's preferences are never entirely self-
generated."11
The normative power of contract law rests on its ability to order
social relationships."" Contract in context and contract as context
are based on a view that contract law should function to be both
preference-protecting and preference-enhancing. The preference-
enhancing view recognizes that the primary role of contract law is to
enforce contract-ordered preferences in a value-neutral way." 6
110. See Morant, supra note 77, at 928.
111. Id. at 952-53.
112. In comparing the notion of informed consent in medical decisions and
contractual consent, one commentator notes that the "doctrinal heterogeneity
bespeaks a recognition that the notion of consent has different meanings and
normative resonances in different contexts." Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking
Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 952 (1994). Another example is found in
insurance contract law, which recognizes an insurer's duty to disclose. See Dudi
Schwartz, Interpretation and Disclosure in Insurance Contracts, 21 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REV. 105, 105-06 (2008) (arguing that the way in which courts
interpret insurance contracts provides incentives to future insurers to disclose
information to potential consumers).
113. Morant, supra note 77, at 928.
114. Vanessa E. Munro, Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and
Legitimating Constraint in the Expression of Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L.
REV. 923, 955 (2008).
115. Contracts seen as a "community of practice cannot be imputed to a
priori identity of understanding or of articulation or explicit conceptualization.
But there can be adequate community of practice to engender a measure of
orderliness." NEL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL
THEORY 16 (2007).
116. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 78, at 36-37.
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However, preferences constituted, at least partially, through the
abusive exercise of power, or the freedom-diminishing influences of
race, class, and identity biases should meet with contract law's
expression of disapproval. Context provides the means not only to
interpret contracts, but also to advance justice-based social and
contractual norms.1
III. IDENTITY, POWER, AND CONTRACTUAL JUSTICE
The assumed neutrality of freedom of contract contributes to a
presumption that the influences of race, gender, class, and power
are irrelevant. Context, however, exposes the fallacy of this
presumption. A 2006 Massachusetts state court decision, which
states that a burrito is not a sandwich, illustrates the insidious
operation of race, class, and culture in contract interpretation."18
In White City Shopping Center, LP v. PR Restaurants, LLC, the
contract term at issue was an exclusivity clause in a commercial
lease."' The provision provided that the landlord would not rent
space in its plaza to any other business that sold sandwiches.120 The
court stated that an establishment that sold burritos did not violate
the tenant's exclusivity right because the plain meaning of
"sandwich" did not include burritos.121 One commentator observed
that the court's analysis "lacked subtlety, complexity, or nuance." 22
This failure underscores the need for a more complete, contextual
analysis of even the most common terms or social conditions.
The lack of acknowledgement of cultural, class, and racial
factors in the interpretation and enforcement of contracts-bias and
discrimination issues aside-relates partially to contract law's
egalitarian underpinnings. Freedom of contract, in its purely
theoretical form, has as its foundation the reasonable person.
Neutrality typifies the reasonable person. She is neither black nor
white, lower- nor upper-class, male nor female, big nor small. To
ignore such contextual factors, however, does not promote, but
rather prevents, the court from examining the effects of biases
related to those factors. Recognition of the influences of identity,
117. See Zamir, supra note 58, at 1714 ("[Slocial values should, and do, play
a key role in the interpretive process . . . .").
118. White City Shopping Ctr., LP v. PR Rests., LLC, No. 2006196313, 2006
WL 3292641, at *3 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Oct. 31, 2006); see also Marjorie Florestal, Is
a Burrito a Sandwich?: Exploring Race, Class, and Culture in Contracts, 14
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 8 (2008); Neil G. Williams, Offer, Acceptance, and
Improper Considerations: A Common-Law Model for the Prohibition of Racial
Discrimination in the Contracting Process, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 183, 183-85
(1994) (arguing that contractual race discrimination can be policed through the
duty of good faith and fair dealing).
119. White City, 2006 WL 3292641, at *1-2.
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id. at *3.
122. Florestal, supra note 118, at 6.
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prejudice, and power in the initial bargaining context challenges
freedom of contract's neutrality rationale.'23 If such influences exist,
then a broadened contextual inquiry should uncover the freedom-
diminishing role such factors play in the bargaining process.
Contract law succeeds in efficiently fulfilling mutual
understandings through the utilization of "stipulated patterns" and
model transaction types as guides to interpretation. 124 A mutual
understandings view of contract law assumes that such
understandings are based upon mutual expectations of fairness. As
such, fairness requires the measurement of bargaining conduct,
whether during the formation or enforcement phase, against a purer
model of freedom. Despite the idealistic contractual law model that
assumedly operates free of irrational bias and discrimination,
contextual realities might occasionally require measured regulation
of bargaining power to ensure the integrity of the bargaining
process. Such context-based regulation for traditionally
disadvantaged parties may allow the weaker party the "freedom to
resist" in the negotiation of contract terms.125
IV. THE SYMPOSIUM
The articles contained in this Symposium demonstrate the
breadth of context as it relates to bargain formulation, contractual
regulation, and contractual equity. Readers will experience both the
internal and external focus of context as the authors examine both
the efficacy and the adaptability of traditional contract doctrine as
applied to various bargaining contexts. Though diverse in their
subject matter, the articles' common thread rests with the
undeniable impact that context has on contract formation and
regulation.
Professor Hillman's article explores the uniqueness of software
contracts.126 Although software is often bought and sold like goods,
software contracts do not fit easily into the sale-of-goods rubric of
Article 2. Based on his work as Reporter for the American Law
Institute's Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,12 7 Professor
123. Robert Hale long ago argued that contract law's decision to enforce or
not to enforce is an exercise of power. See Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress,
and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 621-23, 627-28 (1943).
124. See Florestal, supra note 118, at 8-9 (referring to the "culture of
contracts" as "the set of customs, beliefs, and shared understandings that exist
within society, which contract law incorporates into every agreement"). The
concept of transaction types is generally associated with the work of Karl
Llewellyn. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 42, at 121-24. Prior to Llewellyn,
Nathan Isaacs described the notion of transaction types in his critique of the
First Restatement of Contracts. See DiMatteo & Flaks, supra note 23, at
344-45.
125. See Hale, supra note 123, at 628.
126. Hillman, supra note 54.
127. See Hillman & O'Rourke, supra note 55.
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Hillman explores whether such a project was needed and, if so, what
in particular is unique about such contracts. In so doing, he
examines the fundamental issue posed by this Symposium: should
definitive contractual contexts be better reflected in contract law; or,
alternatively stated, should certain contractual contexts be more
directly addressed by contract law?
Professor Emerson investigates the problem of franchisor
encroachment within the "perceived" territory of an existing
franchisee.128  Since these cases often involve franchise contracts
with no express grant of territorial exclusivity, the focus for many
disputes is on the aggrieved franchisee's expectations and general
concepts of fairness. Emerson explores the muddled case law of
franchise encroachment and provides findings from surveys conducted
in 2000 and 2008 to show how nuances in nonexclusivity clauses can
result in vastly different interpretations. In the end, he suggests a
number of possible solutions, such as requiring expanded disclosures,
including limitations on franchisee rights, use of collective bargaining
between a franchisor and its franchisees, and additional anti-
encroachment statutory or case law protections.
Professor Barnhizer's article explores the appropriate role for
expanded use of context in the regulation, creation, and enforcement
of contracts.129 Expansive use of context to permit regulators and
courts to explore the "real" relationship between the parties provides
a seductive picture of finely grained understandings of all the
factors that relate to the justice of a contract.
As Barnhizer explains, this expansive use of context in contract
is also "seductive for another reason.""o Although particular
components of an expanded contextual analysis are often seen as
important for assessing the parties' relative bargaining power, in
reality, context-based arguments are about power on a more
fundamental level. Arguments for expanded contextual analysis are
really arguments that attempt to "change or expand the
metaphorical field of battle for power in the contract
[relationship].""' For example, the claim that contract law should
explicitly account for the lack of meaningful alternatives facing
consumers, employees, and franchisees in contracting with
established business firms is not limited to accounting for perceived
bargaining power disparities between sophisticated and
unsophisticated parties. This argument is also an attempt to alter
the language of contract regulation, formation, and enforcement by
elevating the bargaining position of apparently weaker parties.
Context is not just a component of bargaining power in individual
128. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Territories: A Community Standard, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 779 (2010).
129. Barnhizer, supra note 37.
130. Id. at 609.
131. Id.
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cases. It also represents control of the power relationships in
contract by those who successfully expand or restrict contextual
considerations to their advantage.
These dual roles of context challenge the operation and
legitimacy of the institutions in which expanded contextual
inquiries seek to operate. Barnhizer analogizes the regulatory
arena, where context is an abstract ideal, as nothing more than the
inevitable give-and-take of Madisonian factions as each interest
group attempts to use its political power to obtain advantages for its
members. He also asserts that although potentially fragmenting,
regulatory context arguments must occur in a functioning
democratic polity, and many of the dangers of fragmentation can be
alleviated through the relatively transparent nature of political
processes. In contrast, context-based arguments in the judicial
forum are more likely to be corrosive and delegitimizing because
they are not legally cognizable. Beyond a certain point, users of the
legal system cannot perceive expanded judicial use of context as
consistently applicable or credible. Barnhizer concludes that absent
mechanisms for demonstrating to users of the legal system in
general the transparency and legitimacy of such contextual
inquiries, expanded application of such factors to judicial
enforcement actions should be restricted.
Professor Phillips provides an analysis of the relationship
between standard form contracting and the doctrine of
unconscionability, as well as other contract policing doctrines.132 He
brings an English perspective to a doctrine that is more expansively
used in other common law countries, including the United States.
Phillips offers a controversial theory of unconscionable bargains that
would supplant other consent-questioning doctrines, such as undue
influence and duress. He notes that the Australian approach
requires a party to show that it was under a serious disability
(disadvantage) and that the stronger party was aware of that
disability.
Under such a system, if the elements of serious disability and
exploitation are proven, then the burden shifts to the stronger party
to prove that the transaction was fair, just, and reasonable. Phillips
notes that "one-sided transactions may be 'fair, just, and
reasonable."'" Thus, the determination of what is fair, just, and
reasonable requires a sophisticated contextual analysis. Phillips
references the United Kingdom's Unfair Contract Terms Act as an
example in which such an analysis is frequently undertaken. He
asserts that the doctrines of duress, undue influence, and parts of
132. John Phillips, Protecting Those in a Disadvantageous Negotiating
Position: Unconscionable Bargains as a Unifying Doctrine, 45 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 837 (2010).
133. Id. at 845.
134. Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, c. 50 (U.K).
572 [Vol. 45
CONTRACT IN CONTEXT
the mistake doctrine can be subsumed into the doctrine of
unconscionable bargains. At their core, all these doctrines require a
contextual analysis of substantive and procedural factors to
determine whether there is a case of unfair active or passive
advantage taking.
Professor Kim places American contract law in the context of
the global market. '5 As she notes in her opening:
An increasingly globalized marketplace and technological
advancements have resulted in greater diversity between and
among contracting parties inside and outside the United
States. The parties to a contract might not share the same set
of cultural references, vocabulary, or business practices.
Technology increases the likelihood of bringing together
parties of different experiential reference points by greatly
facilitating transactions across vast geographical distances. It
also increases the likelihood of substantive misunderstanding
by creating novel contracting situations that often reveal
implicit and unexpressed assumptions held by the parties. 36
Her article asserts that courts should take into consideration the
social and cultural backgrounds and identities of the parties in
analyzing contract disputes.
Kim's article discusses the role that identity and experience
play in contract law and introduces the tension between
sociocultural dissonance and the objective approach to
interpretation. It analyzes the difference that culture makes by
examining a recent contract dispute-the "blood contract" case
between two Korean-born businessmen. 13 Finally, Kim analyzes
the difference that gender makes by examining a case involving in
vitro fertilization. 1 She concludes that courts should consider
contextual factors, including the parties' sociocultural backgrounds
and experiences, in order to better conform to the expressed goal of
contract law-protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties.
Professor Oman begins with the premise that certain religious
traditions, particularly Islam, make law a central aspect of religious
piety. 1' Being a faithful believer means that one voluntarily
submits one's self to religious law. In secular legal systems, where
the state is officially neutral in matters of religion, contract offers a
potential avenue for believers to incorporate religious commitments
into their legal obligations. This strategy, however, creates
potentially difficult questions for courts faced with contracts that
incorporate religious law by reference. Such contracts require
135. Kim, supra note 52.
136. Id. at 641.
137. Kim v. Son, No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9,
2009).
138. In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
139. Oman, supra note 30, at 588.
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secular courts to engage in religious jurisprudence, an activity that
presents thorny practical, constitutional, and normative questions.
Oman uses the Islamic mahr contract to illustrate the
misapplication of a body of specialized rules-divorce law-to what
is essentially a simple contract. He argues that such an agreement
should be reviewed under the general law of contracts.
Professor Threedy explores the importance of context at the
case level.1 40 Her previous research in legal archaeology worked
from the premise that cases are not always what they may seem."
The official or historical narrative of a case may be investigated and
questioned through a closer examination of the nonreported
context. 142  The importance of digging deep into the context of
individual cases was alluded to by Oliver Wendell Holmes when he
asserted that law was an "anthropological document" whose study is
"an exercise in the morphology and transformation of human
ideas." 43  Threedy investigates the famous Arthur Murray dance
cases and discovers that they involved not only female plaintiffs, but
also male plaintiffs. She finds that courts' approaches to similarly
situated parties and almost identical fact patterns were skewed by
preconceived male-female narratives-the helpless, lonely old lady
versus the savvy old man entering the marketplace for
companionship.
Professor Miller examines the importance of considering context
in resolving disputes between majority and minority LLC
investors.'44 The LLC method of business organization is premised
upon freedom of contract principles that allow member parties to
provide a governance structure through the drafting of an operating
agreement that may even include the elimination of fiduciary
duties.' 4 5 The article criticizes the approach taken by law-and-
economics scholars who presuppose a level contractual playing field.
She explores the valuable role that empirical data and
140. Threedy, supra note 87.
141. See, e.g., Debora L. Threedy, Legal Archaeology: Excavating Cases,
Reconstructing Context, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1197 (2006).
142. See generally James J. Fishman, Introduction: The Enduring Legacy of
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. REV. 161 (2008) (exploring the
context and alternative interpretations of the famous Cardozo opinion); Judith
L. Maute, Response: The Values of Legal Archaeology, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 223.
143. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV.
L. REV. 443, 444 (1899).
144. Miller, supra note 83.
145. To review the current debate on the freedom of contract paradigm of
limited liability companies and fiduciary duties, see Larry A. DiMatteo, Policing
Limited Liability Companies Under Contract Law, 46 AM. Bus. L.J. 279 (2009);
Sandra K. Miller, Fiduciary Duties in the LLC: Mandatory Core Duties to
Protect the Interests of Others Beyond the Contracting Parties, 46 AM. Bus. L.J.
243 (2009); and Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual
Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46
AM. Bus. L.J. 221 (2009).
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interdisciplinary research can play in understanding context. Miller
argues that the law can respect contractual freedom, yet leave room
to offer equitable remedies and status-based statutory protections in
recognition of asymmetries in power. In the end, Miller advocates
for expanded empirical research to determine whether lawmakers
should impose statutory LLC oppression remedies that recognize the
importance of enforcing the operating agreement, yet provide
statutory default rules and equitable relief in an effort to resolve
majority-minority LLC disputes in a fair and efficient manner.
Professor Schmitz focuses on what she labels as "consumer
contracting culture.""' In this culture, consumers rarely ask for
contract terms prior to completing a purchase. This leads to the
issue of post-contract consent, which refers to the scenario in which
consumers are bound by terms they receive after purchasing a
product or service. The key question posed in this area is whether
the reception of such terms qualifies as consent under contract law.
The answer has generally been in the affirmative. In Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc.,"' the court concluded that the purchaser
assented to the terms by not returning the computer within thirty
days, as provided by an "approve-or-return" provision. The court
added that this approve-or-return form of contracting benefits
consumers "as a group" since they benefit from the resulting savings
in transaction costs.148 Courts now routinely apply this efficiency-
focused and formulaic analysis to contract terms.
Professor Schmitz explores post-contract consent from
theoretical and empirical lenses in order to shed light on the policy
implications of the post-contract consent rule. She provides
background on the varying theoretical perspectives of post-
contracting consent (classical, law-and-economics, and behavioral),
and then explores the available empirical data on the questions of
whether consumers read contract terms, when they read them, and
ultimately whether the current practice results in unfairly one-sided
terms. Schmitz presents the preliminary results from a recent
online survey relating to consumer form purchase terms.
Professor Abril applies Broken Window Theory ("BWT"), first
used in the area of criminal law, to the online social networking
environment.'49 She argues that rampant evidence of disrespect for
online social contracts-website terms, conditions, and privacy
policies that govern interpersonal interaction and behavior online-
is deleterious to both users and the future of social media.
BWT highlights the power of context to govern individual and
group behavior. Abril explains, the theory posits that evidence of
146. Amy J. Schmitz, Pizza-Box Contracts: True Tales of Consumer
Contracting Culture, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 863 (2010).
147. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
148. Id. at 1149.
149. Abril, supra note 68.
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communal abandonment (in the form of "broken windows") creates a
public perception of ambivalence, which in turn propagates
antisocial behavior and disorder. BWT's second premise is that by
addressing minor crimes (repairing broken windows) the culture of a
community can be changed, thereby creating the perception that no
offense, regardless of how insignificant, is tolerated.
Abril observes that "[tihe online social environment is suffering
from a multitude of broken windows."150 Observational evidence
demonstrates an environment in which dignity and privacy
violations have become the norm. Empirical evidence suggests that
websites' terms, conditions, and privacy policies are seldom read and
understood by users socializing online. Data also suggests that a
majority of users feel helpless in controlling their privacy and
reputation, despite the presence of online social contracts.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that monitoring of violations of online
social contracts is scant and redress is often unavailable. Abril
surmises that this is due to the fact that courts have traditionally
suffered crises of context when applying traditional legal rules to the
online environment. Moreover, there is no existing framework for
online social contracts that is workable and well-accepted. In short,
the "broken windows theory" questions the very role of contract in
the online social context.
Informed by the BWT, Abril proposes a framework for recasting
social contracts in the online context. It focuses on the function of
contracts in establishing expectations, rules, and norms among
contracting parties. Contracts can only be effective in this manner
when they are consistently enforced and are perceived as
mechanisms for proscribing improper behavior.
CONCLUSION: THE SEARCH FOR CONTRACTUAL JUSTICE
The tension between freedom of contract and freedom from
contract reflects the ancient struggle between the right and the
good, and the centuries-old struggle between law and equity in the
Anglo-American contract law system.5 1 A contract law model based
upon unfettered freedom of contract centers on the importance of the
right to contract over the good of the bargain struck. The right of
contracting is closely aligned with the formal application of contract
rules in isolation from both the contractual outcome and important
contextual factors that impact contractual intent, formation, and
performance. This classical notion of contract law becomes a form of
procedural justice, which applies rules objectively, without regard to
societal or humanistic variances. True contractual justice, however,
requires the use of all contextual factors and influences that
150. Id. at 103.
151. See generally LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS:
STANDARDS AND PRINCIPLES (2001).
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question whether the bargain was the product of a free exercise of
the right to contract. The integrity of contract law and the bargains
dependent upon that law, demand an analysis reflective of the world
in which these bargains operate, and in which bargainers must
function.

